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FINDERS KEEPERS: WHO HAS SAY OVER PRIVATE PROPERTY IN
SPACE
Jose A. Martin del Campo†
Abstract
Current space law is unclear as to whether private entities may
claim possession of resources extracted from their endeavors in outer
space. The lack of certainty prevents private entities from entirely
investing in infrastructure and capabilities to access new deposits of
resources due to the depletion of minerals and resources on Earth.
The establishment of a new space regime devoid of non-appropriation
principles found in international law is necessary to motivate private
entities to invest the capital in extracting and transporting space
resources back to Earth.
This Comment seeks to understand how the current framework of
space law impacts the property rights of private entities and their
claim to resources in space. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibited
the claiming of property by sovereign nations. However, the concept
of private entities now having the capability to extract resources from
outer space has reignited the issue of property rights in outer space.
With resources becoming scarcer or priced out of the market, the
solution of mining these resources from celestial bodies has caused a
new space race. Past multilateral agreements have dealt with similar
discoveries such as the polymetallic nodules on the ocean floor;
however, these agreements led to disputes as to ownership and the
rights to extract said resources. With little to no support from the
industrialized nations, the structure of any new regime must ensure
access for the benefit of humankind. The benefit of allowing these
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private entities the right to claim mined resources must be weighed
against potential drawbacks in order to create a framework that
balances the interest of the free market with that of the common
heritage principle. In determining that a suitable framework fails to
guide a new space regime, this Comment proposes that a new
governing body comprising a rotation of space-faring and nonspacefaring nations act as a regulatory body for the interest of all of
humankind.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 4, 1957, the Space Age officially began when the
Soviet Union launched Sputnik into orbit, the first successful, human-
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made satellite.1 A little more than a decade later, on July 20, 1969,
American astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin
became the first humans to land and step foot on the moon.2 Neil
Armstrong marked the completion of John F. Kenney’s national goal
of landing an astronaut on the moon when he radioed back to Earth
“[t]hat’s one small step for man, one giant leap for mankind.”3 The
launch of Sputnik, the moon landing, and other endeavors achieved by
the scientific community, kick-started a chain of events leading to the
current ambition of exploring outer space and mining resources
throughout the solar system.
The push for unlocking low-cost space travel and space
industrialization by entrepreneurs, like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos,
propels the search for extraterrestrial materials such as water and
minerals.4 According to NASA, minerals found in the asteroid belt
between Mars and Jupiter contain an estimated value of approximately
$100 billion for every person on Earth.5 However, uncertainty lingers
because private entities are unsure that they will possess property
rights to their payload or the mined celestial body.6 Celestial bodies
refer to naturally occurring objects in space. The United States
Commercial
Space
Transportation
Advisory
Committee
(“COMSTAC”), an advisory body to the Federal Aviation
Administration’s (“FAA”) Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (“FAA-AST”), has undertaken review regarding the

1. Alan Boyle, Sputnik Started Space Race, Anxiety, NBC NEWS (Oct. 4, 1997),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/3077890/ns/technology_and_science-space/t/sputnikstarted-space-race-anxiety/#.XaSEzHdFxl4 [https://perma.cc/36KV-3SKP].
2. History.com Editors, 1969 Moon Landing, HISTORY (July 21, 2019),
https://www.history.com/topics/space-exploration/moon-landing-1969
[https://perma.cc/LM3K-E6ED].
3. Id.
4. Thomas Heath, Space-Mining May be Only a Decade Away. Really.,
WASHINGTON
POST
(April
28,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/space-mining-may-be-only-a-decadeaway-really/2017/04/28/df33b31a-29ee-11e7-a616-d7c8a68c1a66_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7JXE-YZG9].
5. Andrew Wong, Space Mining Could Become a Real Thing — And it Could
be
Worth
Trillions,
CNBC
(May
15,
2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/mining-asteroids-could-be-worth-trillions-ofdollars.html [https://perma.cc/RP7J-E9JR].
6. Leonard David, Mining the Moon? Space Property Rights Still Unclear,
Experts Say, SPACE (July 25, 2014), https://www.space.com/26644-moon-asteroidsresources-space-law.html [https://perma.cc/J69Q-JK3Y].
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granting of private property licenses.7 COMSTAC expressed a desire
to confirm that private entity resource extractions may be owned and
utilized as it deems appropriate.8
The current framework of space law is a combination of
agreements with the foundation of space law consisting of the 1967
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty”).9 At the time of signing, the
Outer Space Treaty hoped to foster cooperative and peaceful
exploration of outer space without discrimination of any kind.10
However, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty contains the bane of
private property rights in outer space, which forbids the national
appropriation of the moon and other celestial bodies.11 While the
Outer Space Treaty explicitly mentions the prohibition of public
entities claiming celestial bodies, private enterprises risk failing to
have their interest in property rights recognized by the global
community.
Private entities and investors grapple with the issues pertaining
to their rights to mine and extract resources from outer space legally.
Without further international recognition of their property rights,
private entities may shy away from exploring the concept of celestial
mining. The issue of not knowing what laws are applicable, or to
whom private companies are accountable, impedes the progress
private entities make in achieving their goal of harvesting
extraterrestrial resources.
Private entities fear that the non-appropriation clause of Article
II of the Outer Space Treaty, the epicenter of the issue, will strip them
of the right to transport their mined resources back to Earth. A new
legal regime will likely need to be formed that facilitates the
continuation of innovation and promotes the exploration of outer
space. Whether or not past private and public international doctrines,
i.e., the law of the sea, may provide guidance in creating a new
doctrine of space law is yet to be determined.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
10. Id.
11. Id. art. II.
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The advancement in modern technology, along with the
depletion of natural resources, creates a unique opportunity for private
entities to resolve this issue through the exploitation of outer space.
Space law is once again relevant due to its inadequacies in protecting
the property rights of said entities in space. Part II will explore the
different treaties and principles that gave rise to space law, and Part
III will analyze whether the application of such principles should
continue, or if the establishment of a new regime offers a more
beneficial long-term solution. Part IV will then explore the structure
of a new outer space regime and the enforcement of property rights.
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES INFLUENCING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE
LAW
As the world continues to transform and evolve, lawmakers
across the globe must adapt past laws or develop and ratify new laws
to address current events and situations. The venture into outer space
is similar to that of famous past explorations in which customary laws
guided journeys, providing a framework of starting points for the
crafting of the present-age space law. Space law must adapt and evolve
as engineers and the science community make discoveries that past
generations could only dream about. The United Nations General
Assembly (“General Assembly”) maintains the view that
“International Law” is not spatially restricted, and that its charter is
relevant even in the outer reaches of outer space and to celestial
bodies.12 When analogizing to present international treaties, the most
applicable set of principles is that of the high seas.13 Based on the
principle of res communis, issues arise because there is a lack of
precise rules.14 Since the beginning of the space race in 1957, the
United Nations facilitated general agreements on how space
exploration should be conducted. However, an understanding of past
and current laws is necessary to determine how to proceed in
recognizing property rights in space for private entities.

12. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
2003).
13. Id.
14. Id.

OF

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 255 (6th ed.
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A. History of the Current Space Law Framework
Space law is the body of law applicable to and involved in
governing space-related activities.15 Space law is “associated with the
rules, principles, and standards of international law appearing in the
five international treaties and five sets of principles governing outer
space,” originating under the supervision of the United Nations
Organization.16 The foundation of space law, similar to general
international law, is composed of matters such as international
agreements, treaties, conventions, rules and regulations of
international organizations, General Assembly resolutions, national
laws, executive and administrative orders, and judicial decisions.17
Following the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the General
Assembly created an ad hoc committee concerned with identifying
legal issues involving outer space activities.18 The Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“COPUOS”) was established in 1958
and was made permanent on December 12, 1959.19 COPUOS is
intended to endorse peaceful international collaboration and establish
the common interest of humankind in outer space.20 It is the
preeminent body regarding the formation of international space law,
drafting five international treaties and five sets of principles regarding
space-related activities.21 Topics covered by the treaties include nonappropriation of outer space by any one country, arms control within
space, and the freedom of exploration.22 The primary focus of the
treaties being any and all activities performed in outer space be done
15. Space Law, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS.,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2VEG-VYT7].
16. Id.
17. Space Law, supra note 14; See generally For the Industry & the Private
Sector,
UNITED
NATIONS
OFF.
FOR
OUTER
SPACE
AFFS.,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/informationfor/faqs.html [https://perma.cc/BFD6T37F].
18. Elizabeth Howell, Who Owns the Moon? Space Law & Outer Space Treaties,
SPACE.COM (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.space.com/33440-space-law.html
[https://perma.cc/9KGG-X8AL].
19. Id.
20. Id.; See generally TANJA MASSON-ZWAAN & MAHULENA HOFMAN,
INTRODUCTION TO SPACE LAW (4th ed. 2019).
21. Space Law Treaties and Principles, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER
SPACE AFFS., http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html
[https://perma.cc/3LWF-U5YZ] (last visited Oct. 19, 2019).
22. Id.
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so to enhance the well-being of humankind and the promotion of
international cooperation.23
In 1966, COPUOS proposed the Outer Space Treaty, which
was ratified soon after in 1967.24 The Outer Space Treaty forms the
bedrock for international cooperation in the peaceful exploration of
space and the development of new law.25 The Outer Space Treaty’s
principles focus on exploration carried out for the benefit and in the
interest of all countries (Art. I), preclusion of sovereign states from
appropriating celestial bodies in outer space (Art. II), the performance
of activities in outer space in accordance with international law (Art.
III), and the prohibition of launching any kinds of objects or
armaments into orbit that possess nuclear weapons or any other kinds
of weapons of mass destruction (Art. IV).26 Of importance to this
Comment is the language of Article II. Article II does not explicitly
mention the property rights of private entities; the failure to do so led
to a split regarding whether such rights breach the Outer Space
Treaty.27
COPUOS concluded four more treaties following the
ratification of the Outer Space Treaty.28 The second treaty was the
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (“Rescue
Agreement”), which entered into force in 1968.29 The Rescue
Agreement elaborates on Articles V and VII of the Outer Space
Treaty.30 It provides that nations rescue and assist distressed
astronauts, which also includes returning them to their launching
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
26. Id. at arts. I–IV.
27. Id. art. II; Elizabeth Howell, Who Owns the Moon? Space Law & Outer
Space Treaties, SPACE.COM (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.space.com/33440-spacelaw.html [https://perma.cc/9KGG-X8AL].
28. Space Law Treaties and Principles, supra note 21.
29. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER
SPACE
AFFS.,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introrescueagreement.h
tml [https://perma.cc/6QLA-ZCCR] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020); Agreement on the
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched
into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 5, U.N.
Doc. A/6716 (1968), 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement].
30. Rescue Agreement, supra note 29.
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state.31 Also, states, upon request, are to provide assistance in
recovering space objects that re-enter Earth outside of the territory of
its proper owner.32
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects (“Liability Convention”), the third of the five
COPUOS treaties, was under the scrutiny of the Legal Subcommittee
of COPUOS for approximately nine years.33 The General Assembly
ultimately reached an agreement in 1971, and the Liability Convention
entered into force in 1972.34 The Liability Convention expounds on
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty providing “that a launching
[s]tate shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage
caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft,
and liable for damage due to its faults in space.”35 The Liability
Convention possesses the procedures regarding claim settlement for
damages.36
The COPUOS Legal Subcommittee drafted the Convention on
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (“Registration
Convention”), the fourth treaty, from 1962 until the General Assembly
adopted the treaty in 1974.37 The convention entered into force in
September 1976.38 This treaty builds upon desires in prior treaties to
provide a mechanism to assist identifying space objects.39 The
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR OUTER
SPACE
AFFS.,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introrescueagreement.h
tml [https://perma.cc/6QLA-ZCCR] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020); Rescue Agreement,
supra note 29.
34. Id.; See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter Liability Convention].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, UNITED
NATIONS
OFF.
FOR
OUTER
SPACE
AFFS.,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introregistrationconvention.html [https://perma.cc/77Q8-H7SZ] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
38. Id.; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space,
opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15, 16,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201023/volume-1023-I15020-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9X4-NYDT] [hereinafter Registration
Convention].
39. Id.; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
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Registration Convention made a request for the Secretary-General to
maintain the registration and provide open admittance to the
information.40
The fifth and final treaty by COPUOS was the Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (“Moon Agreement”).41 The General Assembly adopted the
agreement in 1979; however, the Moon Agreement lacked widespread
ratification, with only five countries signing by July 1984.42 The
overall purpose of the Moon Agreement was to reinforce the principles
highlighted in the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty and their
application to the Moon and other celestial bodies.43 The Moon
Agreement seeks to encourage peaceful exploration, avoid disruption
of celestial environments, and alert the United Nations of the location
and purpose of any construction of a station on a celestial body.44
In addition, the Moon and its natural resources are identified
as belonging to the common heritage of humankind and, should
exploitation of these resources become feasible, an international
regime should be created to oversee such progress.45
Since its inception, the Moon Agreement, containing the
resource limitation found within the common heritage principle,
garnered little support internationally, particularly within the United
States.46 With only fourteen signatories, none being spacefaring
UNITED
NATIONS
OFF.
FOR
OUTER
SPACE
AFFS.,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introregistrationconvention.html [https://perma.cc/77Q8-H7SZ] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
40. Registration Convention, supra note 38, at art. V.
41. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18. 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3,
https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_34_68E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AJ3UHHJ7] [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
42. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/intromoonagreement.html [https://perma.cc/V9EW-L4WK] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020); Moon
Agreement, supra note 41, at art. IX, para.3.
43. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/intromoonagreement.html [https://perma.cc/V9EW-L4WK] (last visited Feb. 16, 2020).
44. See Moon Agreement, supra note 41, at arts. III, VII, IX.
45. Id. at art. XI, para. 5.
46. Rand Simberg, Property Rights in Space, THE NEW ATLANTIS,
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/property-rights-in-space
[https://perma.cc/XY2M-U8VG] (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
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nations, the Moon Agreement lacks international recognition as law.47
However, the provisions of the Moon Agreement may block the full
economic potential and development of space.48 A comprehension of
international law aids in understanding the principle of the common
heritage of humankind emphasized in the Moon Agreement.
B. Customary International Law and its Underlying Principles
International law, also known as public international law or the
law of nations, is composed of a multitude of legal rules, norms, and
standards overseeing the relationships between different sovereign
actors and other internationally recognized entities on the global
stage.49 Over time, international law grew to include individual
entities and international organizations—crucial elements of
contemporary international law previously omitted from the
definition.50 International law is developing to incorporate not only
rules but also non-binding and influential principles, practices, and
assertions blended with complicated structures and processes.51 The
breadth of international law has grown from the conventional topics
ranging from war, peace, and diplomacy to encompassing “human
rights, economic and trade issues, space law, and international
organizations.”52 International law should be distinguished from
international comity, the courtesies afforded to foreign states, and
from the subject of conflict of laws or private international law, which
is the determination of municipal law involving foreign elements.53
International law operates independently of the system of laws
concerning the legal orders of a particular state.54 There are also no
courts of international law that possess complete jurisdiction over
sovereign states.55 Thus, neither an authoritative international body to

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Malcolm Shaw, International Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 13,
2019), https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-law [https://perma.cc/9KQ93QMS].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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enforce a judgment or the law exists, nor is there an overarching
executive body with supreme authority.56
Public international law is composed of multiple conventions
and principles. Within these international principles, the law of the sea
(particularly the provisions regarding the deep seabed), the Antarctica
Treaty of 1959, and the res communis principle all influenced the nonappropriation provision in the series of space treaties.
1. Aboard the High Seas
“The modern law governing the high seas has its foundation in
the rule that the high seas are not open to acquisition by occupation on
the part of states individually or collectively: it is res extra
commercium.”57 A brief history demonstrates that the high seas
doctrine emerged from two different factors: the increasing dominance
of maritime powers and the reduction of influence from states favoring
closed seas.58
The fifteenth century saw states favoring appropriation of or at
least exclusive rights over the seas, and the Papal Bulls of 1493 and
1506 disseminated the oceans around the world to Spain and
Portugal.59 Elizabeth I challenged the Spanish monopoly on the West
Indies and later affirmed the freedom of the seas in response to Spain’s
protest of the English Drake expedition.60 Later on, English policies
in the seventeenth-century reversed course, promoting the principle of
closed seas.61 This time period signified the peak of the mare clausum
(closed sea) until the eventual fall of the British claim to sovereignty
by the late eighteenth century.62
During the transitioning of the law of the sea, Dutch jurist
Hugo Grotius in 1609, argued in Mare Liberum that the high seas
should be free for navigation and fishing because natural law forbids
ownership of resources created for universal use.63 Grotius’ idea came

56. Id.
57. BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 224.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a
Rule-Based Regime for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 363, 390 (2004).
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at a time when the sea was thought to possess “limitless” resources.64
Grotius stated that the seas were open to all for navigation and fishing
because natural law forbids the ownership of things that were created
to be shared by all.65 His perception was that so long as there was no
interference, nations were free to exploit resources.66 Grotius further
argued that rights to the sea could not exist in the same manner as
rights of land; thus, the sea was “free to all and subject to none.”67 The
law of the high seas evolved from a theory of limited access to one of
unfettered access by the eighteenth century.68 The principle of
freedom of the seas holds that a state cannot appropriate areas of the
sea except for its own vessel when outside its national waters.69
The late eighteenth century saw the implementation of the
cannon-shot rule, and claims to large areas of the sea ceased to exist.70
The cannon-shot rule held that a nation’s sovereignty extends up to the
range of a cannonball.71 The range was first defined as one marine
league or three miles in diplomatic practice.72
Naval power and commercial interests in the nineteenth
century dictated British, French, and American support for the
principle of freedom of the sea and the concept of shared use.73 In
terms of jurisdiction on the high seas, the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (“UNCLOS III”) upheld the general
principle that vessels on the high seas are only subjected to the
authority of the state whose flag they fly.74 With the lack of any
territorial sovereignty upon the high seas, no state of any kind can
assert jurisdiction over foreign vessels.75
The law of the sea provides a foundation for determining the
proper regime to install regarding the application of private property
rights to celestial bodies. This is particularly important concerning the
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 224.
69. Tannenwald, supra note 63, at 390.
70. BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 225.
71. Id. at 180.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 225.
74. Id. at 238; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 90, opened
for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
75. BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 238.
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seabed and ocean floor, which is beyond the jurisdiction of states. In
applying the pre-existing seabed regime of the high seas, the seabed
could not be, in principle, appropriated by a sovereign state.76 Historic
title and prescription played a role in protecting interests such as
sedentary fisheries.77
Concerns such as overfishing and pollution pushed the
international community to begin codifying ocean law.78 The first
convention (“UNCLOS I”) took place in 1958 and resulted in four
non-binding conventions.79 The results from UNCLOS I “largely
asserted the traditional law of the sea, codified traditional practices of
the great powers, and left large gaps which ‘continued to widen during
the subsequent decades.’”80 Issues that remained unsettled included
defining limits to territorial seas, establishing jurisdictions involving
fisheries, and imposing limits on the continental shelf.81 These
unresolved issues, as well as others from the first convention,
ultimately led to a third reconvening in 1974.82
2. The Regime of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor: Common
Heritage Designation
In the 1960s, prior regimes did not cover the viability of
collecting resources from the ocean floor.83 Proposals addressing the
issue suggested either portioning the ocean floor between coastal
states or granting a mining operation to individual entities.84 Immense
deposits of polymetallic nodules containing manganese, nickel,
copper, and cobalt caused this new development in the law of the sea.85
Dr. Arvid Pardo, Malta’s United Nations representative,
proposed that the seabed and its resources, beyond the limit of national
jurisdiction, should be held as part of the “common heritage of

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 241.
Id.
Tannenwald, supra note 63, at 393.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 394.
BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 241–42.
Id. at 242.
Id.
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mankind.”86 Briefly, the common heritage of mankind (common
heritage principle) represents that:
“certain global commons or elements regarded as
beneficial to humanity as a whole should not be
unilaterally exploited by individual states or their
nationals, nor by corporations or other entities, but
rather should be exploited by under some sort of
international arrangement or regime for the benefit of
mankind as a whole.”87
The proposal became part of UNCLOS III, resulting in comprehensive
internationalization of the deep seabed mineral resources.88 The
addition of the common heritage principle, also found in the Moon
Agreement, prohibited the ability of sovereign entities to claim rights
over any part of the area—defined as “the sea-bed and ocean floor and
subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”—or its
resources. The principle also suggests that the International Sea-Bed
Authority should organize and control all activities exclusively.89
Developed western nations, who have not signed the UNCLOS
III agreement, oppose such a change and opine that the ordinary
regime of the freedom of the seas should apply to the resources located
in the deep seabed.90 Thus, the United States and other developed
nations, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom,
propagated legislation to permit and regulate mining of the seabed
resources, forming a “Reciprocating States Regime” that offered
mutual recognition of deep-sea mining activities.91
3. Antarctica Treaty of 1959
In addition to the law of the sea, international law encompasses
other legal treaties that have influenced space treaties. The space law
regime created by the ratification of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is
partly analogous to that of the Antarctica Treaty of 1959.92 The intent
86. Id.
87. Edwin Egede, Common Heritage of Mankind, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES,
(May 12, 2017), https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0109.xml [https://perma.cc/SWM4-T55D].
88. BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 242.
89. Id.; see also UNCLOS, supra note 73, arts. 133, 136, 156, 157.
90. BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 244.
91. Id. at 244–45.
92. Id. at 256.
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behind the Antarctic Treaty is to promote only peaceful intentions and
the freedom to perform scientific research and cooperation towards
that goal.93 The treaty allows the presence of military units, only for
peaceful purposes, and prohibits nuclear explosions.94 A provision
within the treaty states that:
[n]o acts or activities taking place while the Treaty is
in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting
or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in
Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an
existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica
shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.95
The quoted provision is not solely limited to contracted parties
according to the text, and the Treaty as a whole leads to the
questioning of non-signatories’ obligations.96
The issue of exploiting minerals has also appeared in the
Antarctica Treaty.97 Developments against the eventuality of
discovering methods to extract minerals have provoked opposition.98
One contention is that of establishing a regime for the exploitation of
minerals below the ice sheets, while others want to focus on
conservation.99
4. Res Communis in Outer Space
The res communis (defined as a common thing) and res nullius
(defined as something without a master) maxims are two legal
concepts that heavily influenced the laws of the high seas, the polar
regions of Antarctica, and outer space.100 The development of space
law raised the question of the legal status of outer space and whether
or not celestial resources fell under the maxim of res communis or res
nullius.101
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 254.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id.
Louis de Guoyon Matignon, The Res Communis Concept in Space Law,
SPACE LEGAL ISSUES (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.spacelegalissues.com/space-lawthe-res-communis-concept-in-space-law/ [https://perma.cc/GS5K-8EBU].
101. Id.
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With the Outer Space Treaty’s commencement in 1967, the res
communis doctrine dominated conversations regarding the
international law on exploiting outer space and its resources by
sovereign entities and individuals; this doctrine states that outer space
is property to all of humankind and is not limited to solely one
entity.102 The Outer Space Treaty’s Article I goes as far as cementing
the doctrine of res communis omnium (a thing of the entire
community) by holding that the exploitation and exploration of outer
space is a “province of all mankind.”103 The Outer Space Treaty
maintains that outer space is an extra-jurisdictional territory,
prohibiting states from exercising their sovereign rights.104
The application of the common heritage principle in the 1967
Outer Space Treaty has proved divisive and polarizing ever since its
emergence.105 Its philosophical nature forces radical departures from
what may be the norm because it questions the management of
globally valuable resources; applying the common heritage principle
requires a reexamination of traditional principles and doctrines
concerning international law.106 Such classical principles include:
“acquisition of territory, consent based sources of international law,
sovereignty, equality, resource allocation, and international
personality.”107 The underlying premise of res communis may
effectively limit expansion and innovation in outer space in two
particular areas: national security and property rights and
commercialization.108
C. Current National Legislations
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty calls for proper
supervision by the appropriate State Party for non-governmental
activities in space.109 In anticipation of the race to space, national
legislatures adopted their own interpretation regarding the authority of
space mining and the procedures for obtaining licenses. The United

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMAN, supra note 20, at 101.
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States and Luxemburg took their own proactive approach to address
the exploitation of space resources.
1. The 2015 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act
President Barack Obama signed the U.S. Commercial Space
Launch Competitiveness Act (“Space Act”) into law with the intention
to foster and promote a pro-growth environment for the development
of a commercial space agency through private investments and the
stabilizing of regulatory conditions.110 In doing so, the United States
became the first country to adopt a national regulatory framework
concerning space resources.111 Title IV of the Space Act recognizes
the property rights of United States citizens who engage in celestial
commercial mining; this further encourages the commercial
exploration and utilization of celestial resources.112 The Space Act
defines space resource as an “abiotic resource in situ in outer
space.”113
Three conditions must be satisfied to receive protection from
the statute.114 First, the actor engaged in space activities must be
classified as a United States citizen pursuant to Title 51 of the U.S.
Code.115 United States citizens are natural persons of United States
citizenship or legal entities subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.116 Second, United States authorities must provide the citizen
authorization for space activities.117 The United States utilizes “an
‘enhanced’ version of the Federal Aviation Administration’s payload
review process to issue mission authorizations” because, at the time of
adoption, there was no government agency competent or qualified to
110. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90,
129 Stat. 704 (2015) (Preamble to the Space Act of 2015).
111. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMAN, supra note 20, at 102.
112. President Obama Signs Bill Recognizing Asteroid Resource Property Rights
into
Law,
PLANETARY
RESOURCES
(Nov.
25,
2015),
https://www.planetaryresources.com/2015/11/president-obama-signs-billrecognizing-asteroid-resource-property-rights-into-law/
[https://perma.cc/PR377D7D].
113. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90,
§ 51301(2)(A), 129 Stat. 704, 721 (2015) (Preamble to the Space Act of 2015);
MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMAN, supra note 20, at 102.
114. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMAN, supra note 20, at 102.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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authorize space activities.118 Third, the Space Act contains a
Disclaimer of Extraterrestrial Sovereignty, stating that the United
States does not assert sovereignty over any celestial body.119
2. The Entry of Luxemburg into Space Law
On July 13, 2017, Luxemburg became the first European
country to have a legal framework that recognized property rights in
space for the utilization and extraction of materials in accordance with
international law.120 Luxemburg utilized the United States’ own space
property law as a model when developing the “Law on the Exploration
and Use of Space Resources of Luxemburg.”121 This law marks a
stepping stone in the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg’s plan to transform
the nation into the global center for space mining.122 Following the
signing of the new law, the Luxemburg government established the
Spaceresources.Lu initiative to support the space resources
industry.123
D. Legal Framework of the International Space Station
The International Space Station Intergovernmental Agreement
(“IGA”), signed on January 29, 1998, is an international treaty
consisting of fifteen space-faring nations who are part of the Space
Station Project.124 Three international cooperation agreements make
up the Space Station’s legal framework.125 The IGA bound its
members to a long-term cooperative agreement based on “genuine
partnership, for the detailed design, development, operation, and

118. Id.
119. Id. at 103.
120. Space Mining Law Passes In Luxembourg, PLANETARY RESOURCES (July 13,
2017), https://www.planetaryresources.com/2017/07/space-mining-law-passes-inluxembourg/ [https://perma.cc/YT4V-2T9E].
121. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMAN, supra note 20, at 103.
122. Space Mining Law Passes In Luxembourg, PLANETARY RESOURCES (July 13,
2017), https://www.planetaryresources.com/2017/07/space-mining-law-passes-inluxembourg/ [https://perma.cc/YT4V-2T9E].
123. Id.
124. International Space Station Legal Framework, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY,
http://www.esa.int/Science_Exploration/Human_and_Robotic_Exploration/Interna
tional_Space_Station/International_Space_Station_legal_framework
[https://perma.cc/F9TQ-RUDX] (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
125. Id.
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utilization of a permanently inhabited civil Space Station for peaceful
purposes, in accordance with international law (Article I).”126
Following the IGA were the four Memoranda of
Understandings (“MoUs”) “between the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (“NASA”) and the following cooperating Space
Agencies: European Space Agency (“ESA”), Canadian Space Agency
(“CSA”), Russian Federal Space Agency (“Roscosmos”), and Japan
Aerospace Exploration Agency (“JAXA”).”127 The objective intent of
the MoUs is to delineate the responsibilities and duties involving the
design, operation, and utilization of the Space Station.128 The MoUs
also define the management structure and interfaces necessary to
ensure effective utilization.129 Lastly, several mutual Implementing
Agreements dictate the procedure for implementing the MoUs,
distributing guidelines and tasks amongst the signatories.130
Regarding jurisdiction, the IGA signatories may extend
national jurisdiction to elements of the station, which they have agreed
to prove, and over their nationals who are in or around the Space
Station.131 Therefore, the owners of the specific elements aboard the
Space Station are legally responsible for said elements; European
members are recognized as a solitary entity identified as the European
Partners, but each individual European country “may extend their
respective national laws and regulation to the European elements,
equipment, and personnel.”132 The MoUs recognize a partner’s
jurisdiction and national law application in numerous matters.133
Therefore, conflicts of jurisdiction aboard the space station are
resolved “through the application of other rules and procedures
already developed nationally and internationally.”134
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SPACE LAW
Space law has come a long way since its inception following
the launch of Sputnik in 1957. With the progression in science and an
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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impending shortage of raw materials, the current installation of treaties
needs to change to address growing concerns related to space
exploration and development. History provides a pool of resources and
precedents for addressing the legal issues that arise in space.
The collection of space treaties may be interpreted as limiting
sovereign entities from staking claims to celestial resources and
leaving private citizens and enterprises free to extract such resources
from outer space.135 Article II of the Outer Space Treaty explicitly
forbids any appropriation by means of use or occupation.136 The
foundation of space law was formulated at a time when the Iron
Curtain was drawn across Europe; national governments dominated
space activities, and commercial space enterprises were in their
infancy.137 The effort to find a compromise between existing legal
frameworks and international agreements, regarding the private
property rights of private entities in space, requires a resolution to
identify the most appropriate authority to govern private interest in
space.
Regulations based on customary laws make up the current
framework of space law.138 The analysis in the next Section will dive
into the argument of whether customary international law provides a
sufficient perspective regarding the private property rights of nonsovereign states or if a new legal framework must be forged.
A. Does Celestial Mining Violate the Space Treaties?
The emergence of projects to capture and transport resources
from space back to Earth sparked discussions within COPUOS
regarding two main points: (1) are space resource collection projects
compatible with the Article II principle of prohibiting ownership
rights within the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; and (2) do such projects
135. William Herkewitz, The Biggest Barrier to Asteroid Mining Isn’t Technical,
It’s
Legal,
POPULAR
MECHANICS
(Aug.
16,
2016),
https://www.popularmechanics.com/space/deep-space/a22347/asteroid-mininginternational-law/ [https://perma.cc/BW4R-9T4Z].
136. Sebastian Gibson, Space Law: Guide to Development of Space Resources on
Asteroids and the Moon, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/space-lawguide-to-development-of-space-resources-on-asteroids-and-the-moon-52077
[https://perma.cc/95MG-8SRP] (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
137. Space
Law,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
(Apr.
4,
2019),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/space-law [https://perma.cc/84QB-HZAL].
138. Id.
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conflict with the common heritage principle?139 The Moon
Agreement’s language denouncing appropriation has resulted in
different interpretations.
1. Non-Appropriation of Space Resources
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty states that “outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of occupation, or by
any other means.”140 Those who oppose commercial resource
extraction view the Article II provision as broadly precluding all forms
of resource appropriation—whether by a sovereign nation or private
enterprise—of materials extracted from a celestial body.141 The
opposition supports its argument with the provisions within Article XI
paragraph 1 of the Moon Agreement, holding that the common
heritage principle applies to all naturally occurring resources located
in outer space.142 The proscription of both private and public property
rights is again announced in Article XI paragraph 3 of the Moon
Agreement.143
However, a narrow interpretation of Article I of the Outer
Space Treaty counters the opposition’s argument by guaranteeing the
freedom to explore and the use of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies.144 Such an interpretation of space mining “is
considered to be neither an ‘appropriation’ of space parts of outer
space nor of resources in situ.”145 Instead, the space mining activities’
purpose could be understood as a “use” without any demand for

139. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at art. II.
140. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMAN, supra note 20, at 99.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Moon Agreement, supra note 41, at art. XI, para. 3. Article XI, para. 3 states:
“Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or natural
resources in place, shall become property of any State, international
intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national organization or nongovernmental entity or of any natural person. The placement of personnel, space
vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations on or below the surface of
the moon, including structures connected with its surface or subsurface, shall not
create a right of ownership over the surface or the subsurface of the moon or any
areas thereof. The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the international
regime referred to in paragraph 5 of this article.”
144. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at arts. I, II.
145. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMAN, supra note 20, at 99.
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territorial appropriation of the celestial bodies concerned.146 An
analogy to the legal regime of the high seas pursuant to the UNCLOS
III agreement and its incorporation of the common heritage principle
that allows for freedom to fish furthers this point of thinking.147 The
failure of the Moon Agreement to garner more international support
lends further credence to the debate that the limitations regarding
space activities pursuant to the common heritage principle are only
binding to the Agreements’ signatories and are not held as
international customary law.148 Based on one’s interpretation,
determining whether the mining of space resources amounts to
appropriation depends on a narrow or broad interpretation of the Outer
Space and Moon Treaties. Here, it is likely that—like fishing in the
sea—collecting resources would likely not violate the Outer Space
Treaty.
2. The Application of the Province of Mankind to Space Resources
Where did the province of mankind come to affect space
resources? Article I of the Outer Space Treaty states that “the
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, shall be ‘the province of all mankind.’”149 This
principle is located between the language stating that the exploration
and use of space shall be done for the benefit and in the interests of all
humankind and the freedom to explore and use outer space.150 Article
I may be considered of the utmost importance, as indicated by the
Cologne Commentary on Space Law, but it was also thought to be one
of the most controversial.151 The Cologne Commentary on Space Law
held that the common heritage principle brings Article I and the Outer
Space Treaty “in line with the legal regulation of human activities in
other common spaces, such as the activities on the High Seas and the
Deep Sea Bed.”152
“[T]he recommendatory 1996 UN Space Benefits
Declaration” further expanded on Article I of the Outer Space Treaty,
146. Id.
147. Id. at 100.
148. Id. at 99.
149. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9, at art. I.
150. Id.
151. COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW: OUTER SPACE TREATY, VOLUME 1
173 (Stephan Hobe et al. eds., Olga A Volynskaya et al. trans., 2017).
152. Id.
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particularly its Benefit Clause.153 In reiterating the province of
humankind principle in the Declaration’s Preamble, the Preamble goes
on to hold that “[s]tates are free to determine all aspects of their
participation in international cooperation in the exploration and use of
outer space on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis.”154 It
requires “full compliance with the legitimate rights and interests of the
parties concerned.”155
Article IV paragraph 1 of the Moon Agreement also restates
the province of mankind principle in close proximity to the Benefit
Clause.156 However, Article XI paragraph 1 declared the Moon,
celestial bodies, and their natural resources are included in the
common heritage of mankind.157 Article XI paragraph 5, though, states
that nations should undertake and establish an international regime “to
govern the exploitation of natural resources of the [Moon] as such
exploitation is about to become feasible.”158 Interpretations of the
common heritage of mankind, however, are dependent on the context
of its use and purpose for future regulatory application.159
Additionally, the common heritage of mankind has no further effect
on the present exploitation and use of lunar resources apart from the
establishment of a future exploitation regime.160 An expectation exists
that parties bound to the Moon Agreement should make a good faith
effort to organize an international conference and agree upon an
international regime.161 However, parties are not bound to reach an
agreement, and such a conference may reject the principle of the
common heritage of mankind altogether.162 A new, more liberal scope
may even be applied to the principle.163 Based on this analysis, the
common heritage principle is in flux, and its application to space is
still uncertain.
153. G.A. Res. 51/122, Declaration on International Cooperation in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the interest of All States,
Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries (Dec. 13, 1996).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Moon Agreement, supra note 41, at art. IV, para. 1.
157. Id. at art. XI, para. 1.
158. Id. art. XI, para. 5.
159. MASSON-ZWAAN & HOFMAN, supra note 20, at 101.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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B. Why the Law of the Sea Is Not Fit for Space
Outer space and the Earth’s oceans share many similarities,
which makes the law of the sea appear ideal to build a suitable system
to guide property rights in outer space. However, the common heritage
principle embedded in UNCLOS III presents an obstacle to granting
the freedom to exploit outer space resources. The original authors of
the Moon Agreement also agreed with the sentiment of UNCLOS III,
which heavily influenced the Moon Agreement.164 One particular note
taken from UNCLOS III was the regulation of seabed mining.165 The
Moon Agreement intended that resources falling outside the territories
of nation-states—in this case, off-Earth resources—belong to the
common heritage of mankind.166 Developed nations are concerned
with the possible commercial exploitation of outer space and the
protection of such investments.167
Some argue that the common heritage principle found in
UNCLOS III conflicts with the purpose of the Outer Space Treaty
because the meaning of the common heritage principle is unclear.168
Moreover, they claim that interpretations of the common heritage
principle clash between developed and developing countries.169
Developing nations interpreted the common heritage principle to mean
that all space resources are the common property to all nations, and
international control is necessary for redistributing wealth and
technology between nations.170 The United States, however, took a
more laissez-faire approach and interpreted the common heritage
principle to mean free access in exploring and exploiting space
resources.171
164. Rand Simberg, Property Rights in Space, THE NEW ATLANTIS,
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/property-rights-in-space
[https://perma.cc/XY2M-U8VG] (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Sebastian Gibson, Space Law: Guide to Development of Space Resources on
Asteroids and the Moon, HG.ORG, https://www.hg.org/legal-articles/space-lawguide-to-development-of-space-resources-on-asteroids-and-the-moon-52077
[https://perma.cc/95MG-8SRP] (last visited Jan. 19, 2020).
168. Allen Duane Webber, Extraterrestrial Law on the Final Frontier: A Regime
to Govern the Development of Celestial Body Resources, 71 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1436
(1983).
169. Id. at 1436–37.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1437. The United States has long petitioned against government
intervention in labeling resources as belonging to the common heritage principle as
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In drafting a treaty, agreement on definitions is necessary to
create reciprocal commitments between the signatories.172 Thus,
signatories are only bound to their respective interpretations at the
signing of the treaty.173 Drafters would likely impute the UNCLOS III
interpretation of the common heritage principle to the Moon
Agreement.174 As defined in the UNCLOS agreements, the common
heritage principle holds that all nations are entitled to a share in profits
from the exploitation of seabed resources.175 UNCLOS III empowers
the Sea Bed Authority, which is, in part, controlled by a two-thirds
vote of signatory nations,176 to maintain the extraction of seabed
resources in conformity to the common heritage principle.177 In
attempting to reconcile the interpretations, the developing nations
would likely win out as they did in UNCLOS III because of their
superior number compared to already established space-faring
nations.178 Thus, space-faring nations would be outvoted for their
proposed interpretation and be bound to the developing nations’
definition of the common heritage principle.179 This development
would, therefore, operationally incorporate UNCLOS III’s
interpretation of the common heritage principle into the Moon
Agreement because of the desire of developing nations to have a
system similar to the Sea Bed Authority.180
Under this approach, there are two points of contention with
the Outer Space Treaty principles.181 The first issue is that developing
nations regard the benefit for all of mankind as meaning ownership by
all nations.182 Second, the owner not only has the right to use their
property, but also to exclude others who are opposed by the majority
of owners.183

witnessed in denial to ratify the UNCLOS III agreement.
172. Webber, supra note 168, at 1437.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1438.
175. UNCLOS, supra note 73, at art. 90.
176. Id. at arts. 159–60.
177. See id. at arts. 156–57, 170.
178. Webber, supra note 168, at 1438.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1439.
181. Id. at 1441.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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Others argue, however, that accepting the developing
countries’ interpretation of mankind to mean all nations violates the
Benefit Clause of the Outer Space Treaty.184 Each nation would
perceive itself to be an owner in which they are entitled to a vote and
a share of the benefits.185 However, a plurality of nations would likely
fail to represent humankind adequately, and the plurality alone would
achieve their interest.186 Developing nations—who would likely make
up the majority of voting members and desire a regime similar to the
International Seabed Authority—could then require that the nations in
defiance of the Benefit Clause receive the profits of space activities.187
This provision was not meant to reward those that did not contribute
to or take part in the risk of the activity.188 In contrast to the common
heritage principle, the “benefit” provision does not mandate wealth
distribution in which only a segment of humankind receives a
benefit.189
Common ownership would also impact the free use principle
of the celestial body.190 By requiring a majority approval, free use
would be limited without permission.191 As the majority, developing
nations’ interest could hamper the development of celestial
exploitation because of the competition of their mining operations
with the importation of new minerals.192 The ability of developing
nations to limit or eliminate the free use principle directly conflicts
with the general purpose of the Outer Space Treaty.193
An implementation of the law of the sea before the advocation
of restrictions seems to be a more relevant model than the adoption of
the UNCLOS agreement. The space law regime today bears
substantial similarities to the ocean law following the 1958 UNCLOS
but preceding the 1982 UNCLOS III agreement.194 At that time, an
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1441–42.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. The Outer Space Treaty explicitly grants the freedom to explore and to use
outer space and that all activities do not have to be in the interest of the global
community. Webber, supra note 168, at 1442; OGUNSOLA OGUNBANWO,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 65 (1975).
190. Webber, supra note 168, at 1442.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Tannenwald, supra note 63, at 395.
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agreement existed on vague freedoms of the sea, but little could be
agreed upon otherwise.195 States also possessed the ability to pick and
choose from which of the 1958 provisions they would adhere to as
states can do now among the existing outer space treaties.196 Also, as
with the pre-1982 UNCLOS agreement, a relatively small number of
nations with the ability to exploit the realm defined as the space
regime.197 Today’s space law is characterized by broad principles that
are exposed to unilateral interpretation.198
A new space law regime cannot adopt the common heritage
principle of UNCLOS if private entities are to conduct space activities
successfully. A new regime must take into account the interest of all
of humankind and not the will of the developing majority nations. For
a successful transition, the new governing authority must be fair and
allow the development of space mining to occur equitably. The core
of the law of the sea is, therefore, unsatisfactory as the building blocks
of a future space regime.
C. The Antarctica Model Cannot Survive in Space
The main goal of restructuring space law and creating a new
space authority is the exploitation of celestial resources. The
Antarctica Treaty appears to be a suitable candidate to form the
principles of space law because its purpose is to protect the peaceful
exploration of a hostile environment.199 However, the Antarctica
Treaty model lacks an authority to govern the exploration and
development of space; the treaty only allows for consultation between
the signatories in a conference mechanism.200
The conference structure of the Antarctica Treaty proves to be
an inadequate model for the development of space for two reasons.201
First, the Antarctica Treaty proves untested for providing guidance in
this regard because few resources202 worthy of development have been
found in Antarctica.203 In the instance of a party aggressively
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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appropriating territory in Antarctica, the conference mechanisms also
remain unproven.204 Following the ratification of the Antarctica
Treaty, several countries still claimed possession to territory in
Antarctica, thus displaying the faults of the agreement.205
Second, the exponential increase in cost for the mining of
space resources, compared to mining in Antarctica, requires greater
reassurance in the right to mine in order to entice investors.206 The lack
of a governing authority to facilitate the mining of space is undesirable
for private entities risking their investment.207 The Moon Agreement
and the law of the sea fail to provide a cohesive remedy for addressing
the faults with space law. A new regime that is not based on prior
multilateral agreements is necessary for the development of a new
regime.208
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
The current regimes of international law addressing natural
resources on Earth fail to provide an adequate framework to address
the relatively new issues of space law and to amass adequate support.
The failure of the UNCLOS resolution to achieve widespread
ratification must not be repeated if a new international cooperative is
to garner international support among both the major space-faring
nations and those countries still developing space programs.
Potentially exhausting all the global resources could be mitigated or
prevented if private investors had the backing and security of a global
community. An authoritative body, unlike the non-confrontational
conference arrangement in the Antarctica Treaty, is needed to resolve
disputes and prevent the appropriation of celestial bodies.
In order to facilitate a fair and cooperative process, an
assembly of both developed and developing nations with and without
space launching capabilities could issue authorization permits for
mining to private entities. The U.S. Space Act provides a foundation
for a new regime. To facilitate justice, a tribunal of rotating nations
would enforce the permits and punish those who violate international
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space law. A method of arbitration could also be established to ensure
a fair process in which the group of nations will oversee.
A. Creation of a Multinational Organization
Article XI paragraph 5 of the Moon Agreement states that
signatories should create an international regime to oversee the mining
and extraction of celestial resources.209 There is no further guidance
as to structure; the Moon Agreement simply states that an international
regime should be created once it becomes feasible to exploit
resources.210 The drafters likely envisioned an international regime to
monitor and promote the peaceful exploitation of celestial resources.
The purpose behind establishing an impartial, multinational
organization is that it allows for cooperation between space and nonspace faring countries. By including both groups, the interests of
humankind as a whole may be taken into account. The organization
will represent an equal number of space and non-spacefaring nations
so that no one side could influence the decisions. A neutral third party,
such as an expert in space law, would provide the last vote.
Multilateral agreements will help ensure the harmonizing of national
legislation and aid in the elimination of uncertainties regarding private
property rights. The U.S. Space Act provides a guide for establishing
the roles of the new regime.
Private entities will apply for a permit with a proposal, which
the board has the discretion to approve. Because the committee is
composed of different nations, the citizen requirement is moot. The
proposal should detail which resources will be mined, the location of
the celestial body, and the proposed method of extraction. Should the
committee approve the proposal, the private entity would receive a
license permitting extraction to that celestial body. The permit grants
the property rights for the collection and transportation of the gathered
resources.
The fees from these permits could be utilized for the
improvement of science and engineering education in developing
countries or for research funds for nations whose citizens are venturing
into space. This would help distribute the fees and encourage
developed nations to continue funding research and development at
209. Moon Agreement, supra note 41, at. XI, para. 5.
210. Id.
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their discretion. The distribution of fees to developing nations may
also aid in offsetting the revenue lost by importing the celestial
resources.
B. Enforcement of Property Rights
The granting of new property rights will likely create
numerous issues, from trespassing to piracy. Currently, nations do not
possess jurisdiction above the atmosphere. Therefore, a new tribunal
that oversees disputes and determines the proper remedy is necessary.
Whether through a trial framework or a form of alternative dispute
resolution, a court with jurisdiction in space must be available for
private parties seeking legal action.
The framework for the International Space Station
demonstrates that nations possess jurisdiction for their nationals in
space. An authoritative governing structure could hold nations
accountable by imposing fines, reducing permits, and other
restrictions. As nations possessed jurisdiction over their sailing vessels
while on the high seas, nations now should be seen as the keeper for
their vessels into space. This would also allow for binding judgments
should a nation fail to police their own nationals.
The issue of enforcement would occur if there were conflicting
claims or a breach of space law. One solution is the creation of a
tribunal in which private entities could bring claims. A panel of judges
or administrators would hear the matter and issue a decree. These
judges would be selected from a pool of adjudicators whose interests
should be neutral to the conflict. To safeguard neutrality, the pool of
judges should be multinational and comprised of experts in space and
international law. In the instance of an appeal, the panel could be
assembled en banc so that all judges of the court are present to hear
the case. Ensuring neutrality will protect the integrity of the court and
prevent the interest of parties from tainting the ruling.
Another method, that is currently employed by some
international agreements, would be a provision to arbitrate disputes.
By agreeing to arbitration at the onset of the process, parties will know
what to expect in the instance of a claim. Other forms of alternative
dispute resolution may also be available if the parties were to seek
another means of resolving the dispute.
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V. CONCLUSION
If a private entity’s property rights are to be protected in outer
space, the current regime of space law requires a significant
restructuring, if not a rebirth. The Outer Space Treaty and its relevant
influences are too ambiguous regarding property. Current multilateral
agreements contain too many restrictions or do not adequately provide
a sufficient base to model the new space regime. While the law of the
sea is an enticing starting point, the common heritage principle found
within the UNCLOS III agreement removes the law of the sea from
the running as a viable foundation for a new regime. The Antarctica
Treaty is also disqualified because it lacks a strong authoritative body
to resolve disputes.
A new space regime seems like the most appropriate course of
action due to the development of space technology since the launch of
Sputnik. With a new multinational organization to oversee and
monitor space activities, private entities would receive the recognition
and assurance in property rights that they desire. Along with the new
organization, a form of dispute resolution is required to resolve claims
originating in space because no nation has jurisdiction above the
atmosphere. With current needs that cannot be solved here on Earth,
the exploitation of an almost infinite resource should not be denied.

